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Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate 
Responsibility: Corporate Personhood 
Lyman Johnson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article, the first of a multipart project, addresses the nature of 
corporate personhood, one area where law has played a central role in the 
history of corporate responsibility in the United States.1 The treatment 
will be illustrative, not exhaustive. Consistent with the theme of the larg-
er project, the Article serves to make the simple but important point that 
a full historical understanding of corporate responsibility requires an ap-
preciation of the law’s significant, if ultimately limited, contribution to 
the longstanding American quest for more responsible corporate conduct. 
On one hand, the spheres of law and corporate responsibility, although 
clearly complementary, might be seen as distinct, in both theory and 
practice. Law, after all, mandates—with the state’s full sanctioning pow-
er behind it—compliance with specified standards of behavior. Apart 
from a decision to comply or disobey, there is no real exercise of discre-
tion in choosing to abide by the law. “Responsible” conduct, on the other 
hand, presupposes the freedom to engage in or refrain from certain con-
duct. Viewed this way, corporate responsibility concerns can be seen as 
picking up precisely where legal strictures leave off. Consequently, a 
history of corporate responsibility could be written while being largely 
unmindful of law and legal theory. 
                                                 
* LeJeune Distinguished Chair in Law, University of St. Thomas (Minneapolis) School of Law; 
Robert O. Bentley Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. I thank Profes-
sor Charles R. T. O’Kelley and all of the participants at the 2012 Berle Symposium, sponsored by 
the Seattle University School of Law, for their assistance and comments on this Article. The Frances 
Law Center at Washington and Lee University and the University of St. Thomas supported this 
project financially. Thomas McClendon provided research assistance. 
 1. The occasion for my larger project is the expected publication in late 2012 of a book that 
sweepingly and insightfully addresses the history of corporate responsibility in the United States. 
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (Kenneth E. Goodpaster & David H. 
Radbourne et al. eds., 2012). At the request of the several distinguished authors of the forthcoming 
book, I provided a working paper addressing certain legal aspects of corporate responsibility. 
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Scholarly discourse itself suggests a certain academic “siloing” of 
law and non-law treatments of corporate responsibility and its history. 
Both legal and other scholars have written quite extensively on corporate 
responsibility.2 But despite the literatures occasionally overlapping, in 
recent years the academic discourses seem to be carried out more in par-
allel than continually and fruitfully interwoven. On the non-law side, this 
may stem from scholars failing to fully appreciate law’s formative role in 
corporate responsibility. On the law side, it may result from modern cor-
                                                 
 2. There is a vast literature on law and corporate social responsibility. No effort is made in this 
Article to cite to all of it. There are, however, a few works of scholarship that, in addition to making 
outstanding contributions of their own, collect a great deal of the pertinent literature. See, e.g., THE 
NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW (Doreen 
McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu & Tom Campbell eds., 2007); William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic 
Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261 (1992); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767 (2005); Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance “Re-
form” and the New Corporate Social Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605 (2001); Aaron K. 
Chatterji & Barak D. Richman, Progressive Visions of the Corporation: Understanding the “Corpo-
rate” in Corporate Social Responsibility, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 33 (2008); David L. Engel, An 
Approach to Corporate Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1979); Amiram Gill, Corporate Govern-
ance as Social Responsibility: A Research Agenda, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 452 (2008); Lyman 
Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 
2215 (1992); Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach 
to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97 (2009); Symposium, In 
Berle’s Footsteps—A Symposium Celebrating the Launch of the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Cor-
porations, Law & Society, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 777 (2010) (several articles); C. A. Harwell Wells, 
The Cycles of Corporate Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 
51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77 (2002). 
Outside law, the subject of corporate responsibility typically has been addressed by those interest-
ed in corporate social responsibility and business ethics. Corporate social responsibility is often seen 
in the academy as a subdivision of management studies and is explored empirically using the meth-
ods of social science. Among corporate managers, corporate social responsibility is frequently seen 
as focused on external constituencies that include consumers, suppliers, the environment, local 
communities, and so on. Business ethics is often seen in the academy as a subdivision of philosophy 
or theology and is explored normatively using the methods of argument appropriate to those disci-
plines. Among corporate managers, business ethics is seen as a prescriptive discipline focused on 
corporate culture and governance that includes both internal constituencies (employees, managers, 
and investors), as well as the external constituencies noted above. I thank Professors David 
Radbourne and Kenneth Goodpaster at the University of St. Thomas Opus School of Business for 
describing the non-law academic treatments of corporate responsibility. 
In this Article, the term “corporate responsibility” is used to encompass the overlapping realms of 
corporate social responsibility and business ethics. The non-law literature here too is vast. Besides 
the forthcoming book described in footnote 1, useful, illustrative works include the following: 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: READINGS AND CASES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT (Andrew 
Crane et al. eds., 2007); RONALD R. SIMS, ETHICS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: WHY 
GIANTS FALL (2003); R. Edward Freeman, The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future Direc-
tions, 4 BUS. ETHICS Q. 409 (1994); Kenneth Goodpaster, Business Ethics and Stakeholder Analysis, 
1 BUS. ETHICS Q. 53 (1991); Kenneth Goodpaster, Business Ethics: Two Moral Provisos, 20 BUS. 
ETHICS Q. 741 (2010); Malcolm S. Salter, Gaming and the Problem of Institutional Corruption in the 
Private Sector (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper No. 11-060, 2010). 
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porate law’s disavowal of a full engagement with corporate responsibil-
ity, as elaborated in this Article. 
The history of corporate responsibility in the United States itself, 
however, reveals no such neat cabining. The legal vein runs conspicuous-
ly throughout historical concerns about corporate behavior, especially as 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries witnessed the full emergence of 
the large, multifunctional, and now global, public corporation.3 The legal 
thread, moreover, has two strands. First, there is that aspect seen in de-
velopments in positive law, whether legislative or judge-made, as more 
and more of American social life—including the corporate institution—
has been subjected to regulation. Second, there is that aspect reflected in 
the larger legal culture of theoretical and normative discourse about cor-
porate power and appropriate mechanisms for social control of that pow-
er and those who wield it.4 
In addition to taking account of both facets of this legal history for 
a full telling of the corporate responsibility story, it is important to see 
that the two strands are not distinct, but intertwined. Changes in positive 
law mandating (or prohibiting) certain corporate conduct reflect a broad-
er public consensus, a consensus in turn influenced by theories of 
corporateness and by evolving social beliefs about what comprises “re-
sponsible” corporate conduct under constantly changing conditions. Cor-
porations—long deeply embedded in U.S. culture—pervasively affect 
consumers, employees, investors, creditors, media, philanthropy, scien-
tific research, the environment, communities, and public policy. Thus, 
corporations powerfully influence the overall quality of life and create 
societal expectations of appropriate corporate conduct.5 Many such ex-
pectations become encoded into law and, at the same time, are accounted 
                                                 
 3. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN 
AMERICAN BUSINESS 36 (1977) (tracing the emergence of the large, modern corporation). 
 4. A good example is the annual conferences sponsored by the Berle Center at the Seattle Uni-
versity School of Law, where dozens of scholars gather to discuss various issues related to corpora-
tions. 
 5. See Allan C. Hutchinson, Hurly-Berle—Corporate Governance, Commercial Profits, and 
Democratic Deficits 21 (Osgoode CLPE Research Paper No. 11/2011, 2011), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1777487 (“[Corporations have] ‘passed far beyond the realm of private enter-
prise . . . [and] have become more nearly social institutions.’” (quoting from the twentieth-century 
classic work by ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. rev. ed. 1968) (1932))); see also Allen, supra 
note 2 (former Chancellor of Delaware Court of Chancery describing one conception of the corpora-
tion as a social institution). Today, this remains true, as illustrated by a recent Los Angeles Times 
editorial commenting on widespread public disenchantment with corporate America: “Corporations 
today influence their communities and society at large in ways [Milton] Friedman could not have 
conceived, and of which he might not have approved.” Michael Hiltzik, Corporations Need a Social 
Conscience, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/06/business/la-fi-hiltzik-
20111106. 
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for (or explained away) in various ways—and to greater or lesser de-
grees—in theoretical understandings of the firm.6 Conversely, by estab-
lishing new regulatory standards, positive legal change periodically 
ratchets up the level from which ensuing prescriptive discussions about 
yet additional responsible behavior will begin. In short, law and legal 
theory not only dynamically reflect but also shape the larger social and 
ethical terrain in which corporations function and in which discussions 
about “responsible” corporate conduct take place. 
This Article discusses one of the four areas where law historically 
has both influenced and mirrored cultural expectations concerning corpo-
rate responsibility—the emergence of and struggle to come to grips with 
corporate personhood. The other three areas, to be treated in later arti-
cles, are corporate purpose, corporate regulation, and corporate govern-
ance. In addressing each of these spheres, the project’s overall aim is to 
highlight certain key developments in positive law, as well as critical 
issues in the larger theoretical and normative grappling with the phenom-
ena of corporate power and corporate control in a democratic society 
characterized by both a strong private business sector heritage and an 
abiding expectation of responsible behavior. Any apparent legal or social 
accord on these core debates has always been, historically speaking, in-
conclusive and maddeningly provisional. History readily reveals, there-
fore, law’s recurrent role in coproducing, but never finishing, the story of 
corporate responsibility in a dynamic society. 
The subject of corporate personhood is a longstanding and recur-
ring topic that continues to vex and excite, as seen in the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 1886 decision confidently asserting that corporations are legal 
persons for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment7 and in its more 
splintered 5–4 decision granting corporations First Amendment free 
speech rights in 2010.8 Moreover, in the nineteenth century as the corpo-
                                                 
 6. See infra notes 114–22 and accompanying text. 
 7. Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
 8. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). Reaction to the Citizens United decision was 
swift and frequently quite critical. See, e.g., Ian S. Speir, Corporations, the Original Understanding, 
and the Problem of Power 3 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1832672; Elizabeth 
Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood 2–3 nn.1–5 (Dec. 1, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1732910. Many proposals have been made to counter the out-
come of the decision. See, e.g., Larry Ribstein, Abolishing Corporate Personhood, TRUTH ON THE 
MARKET (Nov. 6, 2011), http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/11/06/abolishing-corporate-personhood/ 
(describing various proposals); see also infra note 18. Law review articles on Citizens United are 
proliferating at a rapid rate. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Citizens United v. FEC: The Constitutional 
Right that Big Corporations Should Have but Do Not Want, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639 
(2011); Symposium, Privacy, Democracy, and Elections, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 859 (2011); 
Symposium, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission: Implications for the American Elec-
toral Process, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 643 (2011); David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice 
Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate Social Responsibility After Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REV. 
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rate institution grew dramatically in significance as a source of private 
gain, it appeared to lose its original, explicit public-serving aspect.9 Alt-
hough seemingly a setback for proponents of socially responsible corpo-
rate conduct, state governments never wholly relinquished lawmaking 
control over the make-up of corporate personhood. This confounding 
factor has continued to haunt full-fledged “private” accounts of firm the-
ory.10 At the theory level, the nature of the corporation was hotly con-
tested and has remained so, notwithstanding undoubted corporate per-
sonhood.11 Even as the full contours of corporate personhood were being 
fleshed out in law and theory, the quest for corporate responsibility drew 
on and significantly benefited from the emergence of a distinctive corpo-
rate person that, as a meaningful social-legal actor in its own right, was 
distinguishable from its various formative constituencies. Distinctive 
personhood thus permitted the majority in Citizens United to accord cor-
porations their own First Amendment political speech rights.12 Concern 
about the adverse political and social ramifications of such corporate 
speech rights, however, was central to the dissent in that case.13 
Historically then, corporate personhood has both necessitated and 
bolstered discussions about corporate responsibility, and served to fuel 
important twentieth-century debates about corporate purpose and corpo-
rate regulation.14 Citizens United is just one especially visible example of 
how legal acceptance of corporate personhood invites continuing debate 
about corporate responsibility. Recently, however, the predominant legal 
theory of the firm, i.e., the upgraded 1980s revival of a nexus-of-
contracts theory, although not denying corporate personhood (even as it 
immediately disaggregates it), has served to deflect concerns over corpo-
rate responsibility away from the ambit of corporate law and into other 
venues.15 Thus, theoretical orthodoxy in modern legal discourse accepts 
corporate personhood. But by sharply separating the treatment of internal 
corporate governance relationships from that of a larger institutional re-
sponsibility, modern orthodoxy seeks to sidestep full engagement with 
the ongoing cultural quest for enhanced corporate responsibility. The 
                                                                                                             
1197 (2011); Francis Bingham, Note, Show Me the Money: Public Access and Accountability After 
Citizens United, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1027 (2011); Carol Herdman, Note, Citizens United: Strengthening 
the First Amendment in American Elections, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 723 (2011). 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); see also infra Part II. 
 13. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876; see also infra Part II. 
 14. See infra notes 28, 30. 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
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result is that corporate law today has little to say about a subject of great 
societal significance⎯corporate responsibility. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II provides a historical 
backdrop and describes the relationship between corporate personhood 
and corporate responsibility in U.S. corporations. Part III explains the 
historical societal concerns about corporate activity and who should ad-
dress those concerns. Legal personhood for the corporation has not 
dampened those concerns; it has heightened them. Part IV discusses cor-
porate personhood in the context of corporate theory and analyzes two 
theoretical approaches to corporate personhood—entity theory and the 
nexus-of-contracts theory—and discusses the consequences of the re-
emergence of the nexus of contracts theory for corporate responsibility. 
Finally, Part V concludes that, ironically, modern legal theory trivializes 
the corporate institution and deflects the enduringly important topic of 
corporate responsibility away from corporate law and into other venues. 
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE PERSONHOOD AND 
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 
In 1886, the United States Supreme Court famously and tersely 
stated that a corporation was a legal “person for purposes of the Four-
teenth Amendment.”16 Although a seemingly clear and authoritative pro-
nouncement, the legal nature of a corporation, Professor Morton Horwitz 
has argued,17 was not settled by the Santa Clara decision; rather, it re-
mained as hotly contested after 1886 as it had been prior to that time. In 
fact, the issue of what exactly is encompassed within the notion of corpo-
rate personhood continues to be pertinent to corporate responsibility in 
2012, 126 years after Santa Clara. This relationship between corporate 
personhood and corporate responsibility was seen most vividly in the 
remarkable outcry over the Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens United deci-
sion that struck down federal campaign finance laws and held that corpo-
rations (and unions) enjoyed a First Amendment right to freedom of 
speech, including political speech.18 If the issue of corporate person-
                                                 
 16. Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). For the definitive treatment of 
the historical aftermath of Santa Clara, see Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Develop-
ment of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 223–24 (1986). The article was revised for inclu-
sion in Professor Horwitz’s subsequent book on American legal history. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960, at 65–108 (1992) [hereinafter HORWITZ, 
TRANSFORMATION].  
 17. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 16. 
 18. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. For a description of the widespread negative response to 
the Citizens United ruling and nascent efforts to amend the U.S. Constitution to provide only hu-
mans, not corporations, with constitutional rights, see Susanna K. Ripken, Corporate First Amend-
ment Rights After Citizens United: An Analysis of the Popular Movement to End the Constitutional 
Personhood of Corporations (Chapman Univ. Law Research Paper No. 10-37, 2010), available at 
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hood—and what that entails—had truly been settled in Santa Clara, or at 
some point thereafter, such a ruling should not have been unexpected or 
precipitated such controversy. 
In seeking to reconcile conflicting lines of its own precedent, the 
majority in Citizens United ruled that the identity of the speaker, i.e., 
whether an individual person or a corporate body, did not constitutional-
ly matter for freedom of speech purposes.19 But the concern in some 
quarters, notably Justice Stevens’s lengthy dissenting opinion,20 was that 
such a corporate right might enable wealthy business organizations to 
excessively influence and distort the outcome of U.S. political cam-
paigns, a crucial element in the healthy functioning of a democratic soci-
ety. Justice Stevens supported his position that corporations could consti-
tutionally be distinguished from humans by identifying a few obvious 
ways in which a corporation differs from a “natural person”: limited 
shareholder liability for corporate debts; a more durable continuity of 
existence, even to the point of perpetual life; separation of ownership of 
property and its control; and the fact that corporations have no con-
sciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, and no desires.21 These 
undeniable attributes of corporateness, however, made no difference to 
the majority’s First Amendment analysis. Thus, sharp disagreement con-
tinues today over what legal rights should go along with modern under-
standings of corporate personhood.22 Importantly, pointed disagreement 
also continues today over what responsibilities should go along with 
twenty-first-century understandings of corporate personhood. 
At a more fundamental level, in Citizens United, the justices in the 
majority and those in the minority seem to hold competing theoretical 
conceptions of corporateness, even though neither group elaborated at 
length on this fundamental point or sought to make it a central feature of 
the constitutional analysis. The majority described a corporation as an 
                                                                                                             
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1702520. For an article placing Citizens United in historical context, see 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 999. 
 19. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886, 892. On December 30, 2011, the Montana Supreme 
Court ruled that a state statute prohibiting corporations from making political contributions did not 
violate the First Amendment. W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Montana, 271 P.3d 1, 13 (Mont. 2011). 
Two judges dissented on the grounds that Citizens United controlled. Id. at 14, 16 (Baker, J., dissent-
ing). 
 20. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 971 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
see also Ripken, supra note 18. 
 21. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 971. And to note an old observation, corporations also have 
“no bodies to kick or souls to damn.” This observation was made by Edward Thurlow, Lord Chan-
cellor of England, 1778–1792 and quoted by Terence Powderly in an article that appeared in the 
Southland Times on September 3, 1888. 
 22. In early 2011, for example, the Supreme Court held that the “personal privacy” exemption 
in the federal Freedom of Information Act did not extend to corporations. FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 131 
S. Ct. 1177, 1186 (2011). 
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“association of citizens,”23 thereby suggesting that a corporation is best 
understood as a group of otherwise disaggregated natural persons joining 
together by agreement to mutually pursue a private endeavor. Such an 
association vision of corporateness does not by itself specifically distin-
guish a corporation from a partnership, a limited liability company, or 
any other noncorporate voluntary association but is instead a somewhat 
generic notion. Moreover, it does not explain how or why a corporation 
so viewed—with a range of constituencies likely eager to express diverse 
views—will easily “speak” with the singularity of a “corporate” voice.24 
Yet, the hierarchical governance structure of a corporation is such that a 
small group will decide for all others what the “corporation” will say; 
various individuals—including shareholders—may be offered channels 
to speak “within” the corporation, but they certainly have no authority to 
speak “for” it. This disjunction between voice “within” and voice “on 
behalf of” a corporation is not the same for other associations of humans 
where internal and external speech rights align, or even for an individual 
human where a range of “voices”—sometimes honest, sometimes dis-
sembling, sometimes generous, sometimes selfish—are typically used as 
and when any particular individual, acting alone, so chooses. 
The dissent in Citizens United, by contrast, asserted that corpora-
tions had been “delegated responsibility for ensuring society’s economic 
welfare.”25 This emphasis not only highlights the ultimate source of cor-
porate power26 but it also suggests a public, not merely private, dimen-
sion to corporate personhood of a kind permitting, among other control 
features, retained government limits on political speech. Thus, the two 
sets of justices not only openly sparred over the First Amendment rights 
of corporations but they also seem to be animated by markedly differ-
ent—if not fully articulated—visions of corporate personhood, and its 
public or private origins and character. 
                                                 
 23. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 906–07. This language is quite similar to that used in a 1906 
Supreme Court decision holding that corporations have Fourth Amendment rights. Hale v. Henkel, 
201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (“[A] corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals . . . .”). 
 24. See Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech And 
Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 495 (2011) (noting that in the 
modern corporation there is “no singular corporate voice”). 
 25. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 971 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Stevens expressly stated that his views did not specifically depend on a particular conception of 
corporateness because corporations differed from natural persons. Id. at 971 n.72. But his view that 
corporations possess a “delegated” economic authority makes his conception of corporateness more 
public-oriented in origin and character than the majority’s. 
 26. A widely lauded corporate law treatise made this obvious but oft-forgotten point in 1986. 
ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 22 (1986) (“The state has power; it chooses to delegate it to 
the board of directors of a corporation.”). 
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Historically, corporate personhood has entailed an ever-expanding 
set of rights. It includes rights that are, like free speech, constitutional in 
nature, as well as the rights to own and transfer property in forms sepa-
rate from the property of shareholders, to “partition” that property for 
firm creditors rather than shareholder creditors, to enter and enforce con-
tracts, to initiate and defend lawsuits, and so on. The significance of 
modern understandings of corporate personhood goes far beyond the is-
sue of corporate rights, however. Corporate personhood is immensely 
important to the subject of corporate responsibility as well. And this is 
true in ways going far beyond the political implications of corporate 
speech, as raised by those alarmed at the Citizens United decision.27 Crit-
ics of this decision were concerned about what corporate spending might 
mean for political campaigns, a legitimate concern whatever one’s ulti-
mate view on corporate personhood, and one with a long lineage in his-
torically negative concerns about corporateness. 
But the historical emergence of corporate personhood held promise 
as well as peril. The legal recognition of a distinctive corporate person—
at least in the public corporation—represented a historically critical ac-
knowledgment that control over an enterprise and its property and affairs 
had solidified in the hands of directors and managers, not stockholders or 
other participants in some amorphous association. Also, the interests of 
the business enterprise itself could not simplistically be equated with 
those of either investors or managers, each of whose interests might be at 
odds with those of the other and with broader social interests. This new 
legal-social actor—the corporation—may have held the power to inflict 
widespread harm, but it also had enormous potential to affirmatively ad-
vance societal expectations extending beyond the particular goals of cap-
ital providers and corporate managers. The capacity to inflict harm and 
the capacity to confer benefits are two sides of the same corporate-
responsibility coin. 
Concerns about the appropriate exercise of corporate power and in-
fluence eventually led to far-ranging and ongoing debates about a corpo-
ration’s overall institutional responsibilities, and specifically, about cor-
porate duties, both by corporations themselves and by the business elites 
controlling them.28 Concerns over the fiduciary duties of directors and 
managers inevitably raised, in turn, the baseline question of corporate 
purpose,29 while a conception of corporations as distinct persons facili-
                                                 
 27. See supra notes 8, 18. 
 28. This subject will be addressed in the second part of this project. Lyman Johnson, Law in 
the History of Corporate Responsibility: Corporate Purpose (forthcoming). 
 29. Id. 
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tated wide-ranging legal regulation of corporations themselves,30 as dis-
tinct from their human managers or other participants. Thus, the emer-
gence of, and continued grappling with, a separate corporate personality, 
historically has been and still is, a significant breakthrough for corporate 
responsibility⎯legal and otherwise. Corporate responsibility has entailed 
negative concerns about  harm-causing corporate behavior flowing from 
the endowing of corporate rights and more affirmative benefit-creating 
demands flowing from evolving expectations of corporate responsibility. 
Some might decry rights for corporations and emphasize broader 
responsibilities, while others might celebrate corporate rights but resist 
corresponding responsibilities. In each case, however, the focus was on 
the rights and responsibilities of the corporate institution itself, not mere-
ly those of managers or investors or others associated with the corpora-
tion. This fascination with the corporation itself remained true even as 
the full contours of corporate legal personhood were still being fleshed 
out and disputed over the many decades leading up to, and now continu-
ing after, Citizens United. The successful emergence of a distinct corpo-
rate person cannot be separated from, and only highlights, the deeper 
issues of societal expectation and societal control of the corporation. 
III. THE APPARENT DESUETUDE OF PUBLIC-SERVING CORPORATENESS; 
UNEXERCISED PUBLIC CONTROL OVER CORPORATENESS 
A. Corporateness for Private Gain 
Concerns about corporate responsibility continued after the emer-
gence of a legally distinct corporate person, but they existed long before 
as well. The early, pre-Santa Clara phase of the U.S. corporate responsi-
bility issue reflected an ostensible dramatic shift in how society per-
ceived the intended thrust of corporate activity. Specifically, the early-
nineteenth century saw a turn toward the growing use of the corporate 
form to conduct business for private gain, a movement that grew dramat-
ically throughout that century. This meant that during this period, the 
history of American business became entwined with the history of the 
corporation, and the shifting features of and attitudes toward the latter 
might be mistaken for those of business endeavors more generally. Prior 
to the nineteenth century, for example, many corporations were charged 
with carrying out public-serving functions,31 but this was not a require-
                                                 
 30. This subject will be addressed in the third part of this project. Lyman Johnson, Law in the 
History of Corporate Responsibility: Corporate Regulation and Corporate Governance (forthcom-
ing). 
 31. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 16, at 112. Justice Stevens emphasized this histo-
ry in his opinion in Citizens United v. FCC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 949 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
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ment of business more generally. This public-service dimension seems 
not to have been an express legal prerequisite to corporate formation but 
instead reflected in practice a shared belief about the proper focus of cor-
porate activity. Thus, colleges, guilds, and municipalities were often or-
ganized as corporations, as were such public-serving transportation ven-
tures as canals or turnpikes.32 As of 1780, by contrast, colonial legisla-
tures had chartered a mere seven business corporations.33 By 1800, only 
about 335 business corporations had been chartered, and most were or-
ganized in just the last few years of the eighteenth century.34 In short, the 
business corporation as we know it today was not a predominant figure 
in this country’s early social landscape. Moreover, there appears to have 
been a correlating of corporateness with public-oriented service of a sort 
that did not exist with business activity more generally. 
During this early period, corporations were created by the confer-
ring of a special legislative charter, not via the general incorporation 
statutes we know today. One reason for this, emphasized by Justice Ste-
vens in Citizens United, is that many persons believed corporations 
needed close scrutiny precisely because they were supposed to act con-
sistent with public welfare.35 Apparently, in this belief, it was not busi-
nesses as such that required close regulatory scrutiny, but only those en-
deavors—business or otherwise—carried out in corporate form. The 
charter was a useful regulatory mechanism that could impose limits on 
businesses conducted in corporate form that were more restrictive than 
those imposed on individuals doing business, such as limits on capitali-
zation, property holdings, and duration of existence.36 Thus, it was in the 
legal process for granting a corporate charter, not in the substantive re-
quirements of law itself that the public-serving character of 
corporateness was in theory to be assured by the state. The general in-
corporation statutes, now familiar in every state, did not arise and spread 
until the early- and mid-nineteenth century.37 
                                                                                                             
part and dissenting in part); see also Speir, supra note 8, at 11–12 nn.47–48 (collecting references to 
public service aspect of early corporations). For authoritative treatments of the early American busi-
ness corporation more generally, see id. at 3–4 n.10. 
 32. Speir, supra note 8, at 11–12 nn.47–48; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 926. (Scalia, J., con-
curring). 
 33. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 16, at 112. 
 34. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 949 n.53 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 35. Id. at 949 (citing authority); see also supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 36. Speir, supra note 8, at 42–43; David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 
201 (describing restrictions). 
 37. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 439, 440 (2001). General incorporation statutes began with religious corporations in the late-
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Special corporate charters, even if purportedly doled out to assure 
consistency with public welfare broadly speaking, fostered perceptions 
of political cronyism in gaining corporate status, a perception that led to 
their decline.38 Thereafter, with special legislative action being unneces-
sary to obtain a corporate charter, corporate status became widely avail-
able. And there appeared to be no legal mechanism to ensure that corpo-
rations, once formed, must actually serve some public purpose. The early 
general incorporation statutes imposed strict limits on the corporation39 
but did not require public service as a condition to obtaining corporate 
status. This change in legal procedure for corporate formation therefore 
had potentially profound negative implications for the public-serving 
character of corporations, even though apparently it was not disavowal of 
that character of corporateness but concerns about cronyism that ended 
special chartering. 
An illustrative statement of the early public-serving belief about 
corporateness can be seen in an 1809 Virginia Supreme Court opinion 
affirming the legislative chartering of an insurance company. Specifical-
ly, the court noted the following: 
They ought never to be passed, but in consideration of services to be 
rendered to the public . . . . It may be often convenient for a set of 
associated individuals, to have the privileges of a corporation be-
stowed upon them; but if their object is merely private or selfish; if 
it is detrimental to, or not promotive of, the public good, they have 
no adequate claim upon the legislature for the privileges.40 
In this passage, the court twice referred to the privileges of corporate sta-
tus and twice to the element of public service. This judicial opinion ex-
emplifies the belief that in the early-nineteenth century, there was no in-
herent legal right to carry on private business in the corporate form. 
By the time of the 1819 Supreme Court decision in Trustees of 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward,41 this express public-service concep-
tion of corporateness was in apparent decline even as the chartering of 
                                                                                                             
eighteenth century and were extended to business corporations in the early-nineteenth century. Speir, 
supra note 8, at 34–35 nn.247–50. 
 38. Speir, supra note 8, at 34–35 nn.247–50. 
 39. Id. at 42–43. 
 40. Currie’s Adm’rs v. Mut. Assurance Soc’y, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 315, 437–48 (1809). 
Interestingly, the court referred to “associated individuals”—as did the majority in Citizens United—
yet, the Virginia Supreme Court still insisted that such a conception of corporateness supported a 
public-serving function. The Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776 was explicit that “no man, or set of men, 
are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in considera-
tion of public services.” Speir, supra note 8, at 33 n.237. This provision was applied to corporations 
in the 1809 decision by the Virginia Supreme Court. 
 41. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
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business corporations was on the rise.42 An abiding societal concern with 
responsible corporate behavior by no means disappeared with the decline 
of public-serving corporateness but instead found fuller expression in 
strict regulation of corporations. Initially, this regulation took place with-
in corporate law itself, and thereafter, through other laws43 when corpo-
rate law ceased being regulatory.44 Moreover, societal expectations also 
resurfaced in protracted twentieth-century debates about corporate pur-
pose,45 debates that periodically revived the earlier public-serving under-
standing of corporateness. Critically, the Dartmouth College case itself 
still emphasized the legally constructed and “unnatural” character of a 
corporation, preserving in this manner a powerful mechanism of social 
control over corporations even if it was thought to be socially beneficial 
to permit corporations to serve private interests during this period. The 
Court in Dartmouth College stated: “A corporation is an artificial being, 
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being 
the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the 
charter of its creation confers upon it.”46 
Although the Court acknowledged a state’s power to grant or with-
hold attributes upon formation of a corporation, it did not permit a state 
to later alter those attributes unless, as noted by Justice Story in his con-
curring opinion, states initially reserved that power to themselves,47 a 
power easily exercised. Even prior to the Dartmouth College decision in 
1819, the Supreme Court in its 1804 decision, Head & Armory v. Provi-
dence Insurance Co.,48 had emphasized that corporations had limited 
powers and must strictly conform to legally prescribed modes of acting. 
In other words, corporations could be formed to advance private interests 
but—unlike natural persons—they possessed only those traits conferred 
by law, whether they served public or private interests.49 Thus, unlike 
humans, corporations are not inherently “by the Laws of Nature and Na-
                                                 
 42. See supra note 31. 
 43. Johnson, supra note 30. 
 44. The subject of the deregulatory turn in corporate law and the rise of “external” regulation 
will be treated in a separate article. See id. 
 45. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 46. Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 636. 
 47. Id. at 712 (Story, J., concurring). States already had begun inserting such “reserved powers 
to amend” in corporate charters before the Dartmouth College decision, and after that decision, this 
movement carried over to general corporation statutes. Today, forty-nine states and the District of 
Columbia have reserved powers to amend in their corporate statutes or constitutions. Speir, supra 
note 8, at n.272. 
 48. Head & Armory v. Providence Ins. Co., 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 127, 169 (1804). 
 49. For a good recent summary of this “artificial person” theory of corporateness, see Ripken, 
supra note 2, at 106–09. 
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ture’s God . . . endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
Rights . . . .”50 
B. Public Control over Corporateness 
It is important to modern theoretical understandings of corporate 
personhood to remember that the “artificial being” and “mere creatures 
of law” language from the 1819 decision in Dartmouth College has never 
been renounced. In 1987, 160 years after the Dartmouth College deci-
sion, the Supreme Court expressly invoked the language in a landmark 
decision, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,51 upholding Indi-
ana’s antitakeover statute against constitutional attack. The Indiana stat-
ute, like many of that era, was shrewdly embedded in the Indiana corpo-
ration statute to curb rampant takeover activity of the 1980s that, rightly 
or wrongly, was widely thought to be socially harmful.52 The Supreme 
Court’s pointed use of the Dartmouth College language in the CTS deci-
sion suggests that Professor Horwitz was premature in asserting that the 
“grant” theory of corporateness—i.e., that the corporation was an artifi-
cial being created by the state with limited, legally endowed powers—
had eroded by the late-nineteenth century.53 If it had eroded at that time, 
as Horwitz contends,54 then it sprang to life again in 1987 as the Supreme 
Court upheld state efforts to dampen investor hopes of premium-carrying 
takeover bids by relying, in part, on just that basis.55 Today’s Supreme 
Court may not have a fully settled theory of corporate personhood, as 
evidenced by the dueling opinions in Citizens United,56 but it has not jet-
tisoned the position that corporations possess only those features with 
which they are endowed by law and that legislatures may advance the 
                                                 
 50. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). 
 51. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987). The Court rejected both 
Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause attacks on the Indiana statute. Justice Powell wrote the 
majority opinion in CTS. His earlier concurring opinion in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 
(1982), signaled to state lawmakers that there was room for state regulation of hostile takeovers. See 
Lyman Johnson, Making (Corporate) Law In A Skeptical World, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161 
(1992). 
 52. Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 846 (1989). 
 53. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 16, at 72. Some other scholars also do not fully 
consider the CTS decision in their assessment. See Ripken, supra note 2, at 109 (“The artificial per-
son theory of the corporation diminished in relevance over time.”). But see Avi-Yonah, supra note 
18 (discussing CTS). 
 54. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 16, at 72. 
 55. See supra note 51. 
 56. See supra notes 17–25 and accompanying text. 
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public welfare through corporate statutes.57 Social control over corpora-
tions through corporate statutes may have substantially declined in the 
twentieth century, but it remains a potentially potent instrument. 
Even if corporations eventually gained a fuller measure of legal 
personhood in the 124 years from Santa Clara to Citizens United and 
were permitted to advance private interests, the vein of legal thought that 
corporations still were not wholly “natural” has never disappeared.58 Pro-
fessor Horwitz’s analysis notwithstanding,59 as a matter of positive law, 
corporations are legislatively endowed with—rather than inherently in 
possession of—certain traits.60 This is true even though modern corpo-
rate statutes, such as the influential Model Business Corporation Act, 
broadly liken corporate powers to those of individuals and confer on cor-
porations the “same powers as an individual to do all things necessary or 
convenient to carry out its business and affairs.”61 Apart from such ex-
press legislative grants of corporate powers, one wonders how else such 
human powers—or such obviously “unnatural” (or at least nonhuman) 
features as limited liability and perpetual duration—would or could arise. 
The legal attributes of limited liability and perpetual duration do not arise 
simply by an agreement of private parties to form a corporation.62 Rather, 
although such agreements are a necessary condition to forming corpora-
tions, without state action they are not themselves a sufficient condition 
to create or endow corporations with those unusual traits. Moreover, un-
der the reserved power to amend corporate statutes,63 states can and do 
amend corporate statutes in ways that some corporate participants them-
selves might find highly objectionable ex post.64 
                                                 
 57. Even the 1906 decision, Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906), stated that the “corpora-
tion is a creature of the State.” In fact, Hale also used language suggesting a public-serving function 
of corporateness: A corporation “is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public.” Id. 
 58. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 59. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 60. See Hutchinson, supra note 5, at 27 (noting the “neglected fact that the corporate form is a 
distinctly public-created institution which is brought into existence by the state and has certain con-
ditional powers delegated to it by the state”). Recently, the editors of the market-favoring publication 
the Economist noted that “limited liability is a privilege” and “a concession—something granted by 
society because it has a clear purpose.” Corporate Anonymity—Light and Wrong, ECONOMIST, Jan. 
21, 2012, at 16, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21543164. 
 61. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (2008). 
 62. See Corporate Anonymity—Light and Wrong, supra note 60 (“[T]he rest of us are giving a 
limited company [corporation] owner’s a perk.”). 
 63. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 676 (1819) (Story, J., 
concurring). 
 64. Certainly, many shareholders in potential target companies and hostile bidders themselves 
did not like antitakeover legislation of the kind upheld in the CTS decision. See Johnson & Millon, 
supra note 52. 
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Therefore, as a matter of widespread convention and practice, mod-
ern legislatures confer (and occasionally withdraw) very broad powers 
and other attributes of legal personhood on corporations—and doing so 
greatly facilitates doing business in the corporate form. But under the 
never-renounced reasoning of Dartmouth College and CTS, it is not clear 
that as a matter of constitutional law, they must do so, Citizens United 
notwithstanding. Citizens United presupposes a corporation with typical-
ly broad modern powers ordained by state law and holds that such a full-
formed corporation enjoys First Amendment rights. It does not hold—or 
even address—whether states must in fact confer expansive, human-like 
powers on corporations in the first place. The text of the First Amend-
ment, after all, forbids state action inhibiting existent rights and, for ex-
ample, prohibits government actors from making a law “abridging” free-
dom of speech.65 It does not, however, affirmatively create or confer 
such a right of speech on a corporation where a state chooses not to do so 
by refraining from even granting that power at inception. And a corpora-
tion that never possessed a capacity to speak (politically or otherwise), or 
that has the capacity only because it affirmatively selected such an “opt-
in” feature, cannot have had such a nonexistent right “abridged” by gov-
ernment action.66 
Citizens United does not hold to the contrary. If it did, it would 
clash squarely with the enduring teachings of Dartmouth College and 
CTS that corporations have only those traits with which they are, by law, 
endowed.67 Perhaps it is for this reason that the majority in Citizens Unit-
ed sidestepped the fundamental issue of corporateness in favor of its 
more amorphous association-of-citizens conception.68 This notion per-
mits a full-voiced corporation to engage in political speech because such 
a corporation is, in the majority’s eyes, just an “association of [natural] 
citizens.”69 This resolves the speech rights of the typical, broadly em-
powered modern corporation while allowing the Citizens United Court to 
                                                 
 65. U.S. CONST., amend. I. 
 66. Justice Scalia elsewhere stated that “the State cannot exact as the price of those special 
advantages the forfeiture of First Amendment rights.” Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 
U.S. 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). But a feature never granted to a corporation is not “for-
feited.” And when dissenting in an earlier corporate-speech decision, Justice Rehnquist observed that 
“the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a State to endow a business corporation with the power 
of political speech.” First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 826 n.6 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting). 
 67. See supra notes 41–47 and accompanying text. 
 68. See supra note 23. For a critique of Citizens United as not comporting with traditional 
corporate law principles, see Tucker, supra note 24. 
 69. See supra note 23. 
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avoid the issue70 (not before it) of whether a state, under Dartmouth Col-
lege and CTS, could constitutionally create politically “voiceless” corpo-
rations by electing not to endow them with that particular trait—or other 
traits thought inconsistent with the public good—in the first place.71 
The critical issue then for ongoing concerns about the relationship 
between law and corporate responsibility is not simply the shifting sub-
stantive contours of emergent corporate personhood or the public-serving 
or private-serving character of corporate endeavor. Instead, the key legal 
issue is who in society determines those substantive contours and that 
character. Although having seemingly abandoned in the early-nineteenth 
century any insistence that corporations serve public welfare in some 
fashion, state governments today could easily reassert legal control over 
the structural make-up of corporations to make them more socially re-
sponsible. They could do so under an artificial-person theory of the kind 
last endorsed in CTS. That states historically have not often used their 
corporate statutes to control the composition of corporations formed for 
private gain so as to achieve public-serving outcomes (the statute upheld 
in CTS being a notable exception)72 does not mean they lack power to do 
so. We should not confuse a longstanding custom or competitive “race” 
among states to craft attractive, business-friendly laws with legal or his-
torical necessity, even if those practices reach deep into the nineteenth 
century. Rather, for a long stretch of history, corporations have been 
permitted to advance private interests and corporate law itself has been 
deregulatory, but only because that particular approach was thought to be 
socially beneficial. 
Thus, even today, corporate law could readily be used to modulate 
corporate conduct in ways thought to be more responsible and public-
serving by altering one or more core attributes of corporate personhood. 
The example of political speech simply serves to illustrate this continu-
                                                 
 70. In his dissent, for example, Justice Stevens made it clear that particular theories of 
corporateness were of no consequence to his view that corporations differed from natural persons 
and could be treated differently under the First Amendment. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 
971 n.72 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 71. It should be noted that the Montana statute prohibiting political contributions by corpora-
tions was not housed in the corporate statute, which broadly empowered corporations, but was in a 
statute regulating elections and campaign practices. See supra note 19. In my view, a more sound 
legislative strategy would be to address this issue in the corporation statute, where the formative 
attributes of a corporation are specified. 
Ian S. Speir separately recognizes this possibility under state corporate law but is not certain such 
an approach would pass constitutional muster. Speir, supra note 8, at 60–61. For a consideration of, 
but ultimately a rejection of, an approach to regulating the corporate-governance processes authoriz-
ing corporate speech, see Larry E. Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1019 (2011). 
 72. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 52. 
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ing “reserved power.” Here, states concerned about corporate speech 
would not amplify or regulate expressive speech by corporations (or con-
stituencies within them)73 but would act by not endowing companies 
with the trait of political speech in the first place. This contemporary, and 
still contentious, subject is highlighted here only because it serves as just 
one illustration of a more general power. The existence of unexercised 
power over corporations means the fully emergent corporate “person” 
need not be in either rights or responsibilities legally identical to humans, 
and corporations likewise need not simplistically be equated to the insti-
tution of business more generally. Moreover, at the theory level, the con-
structed legal nature of the corporation reveals the ineradicable role of 
the state in specifying corporate characteristics and relations, notwith-
standing a remarkably long historical period when state passivity might 
have legally disguised continuing social expectations of corporate re-
sponsibility. 
IV. CORPORATE PERSONHOOD AND CORPORATE THEORY: DISTINCT 
ENTITY OR CONTRACTUAL AGGREGATION OF INDIVIDUALS 
The second historical phase of the corporate personhood issue, 
post-Santa Clara, did not directly involve the earlier (and still latent) 
public- versus private-serving character of the corporate function but in-
stead raised more pointedly the legal-existential question of what a cor-
poration really “is,” and beneath that question, the issues of who con-
trolled this institution and for what ends. Notwithstanding formal legal 
recognition of corporate personhood, the character of corporateness con-
tinued to be perplexing. Was it simply an aggregation of human individ-
uals or was it a separate entity—whether “natural” or “artificial”—
distinct unto itself?74 This question, as Professor Horwitz observes,75 was 
not settled by but only intensified on the heels of the 1886 decision in 
Santa Clara. Moreover, the legal and philosophical tussle over the “true” 
nature of corporate personhood became meaningful only in light of the 
dramatic growth in the number of corporations—and their rising socio-
                                                 
 73. Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Robert Jackson address who should have political voice in 
a public corporation—and they advocate shareholders and independent directors for that role—but 
they do not treat the more basic power and regulatory issue of state legislatures not conferring the 
trait of (political) speech in the first instance. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate 
Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010); see also David G. Yosifon, Dis-
course Norms as Default Rules: Structuring Corporate Speech to Multiple Stakeholders, 21 HEALTH 
MATRIX 189 (2011) (proposing discourse norms for corporate speech to stakeholders). 
 74. See Millon, supra note 36; Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corpora-
tion in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 (1987). 
 75. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 16. 
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economic prominence—throughout the nineteenth century and into the 
twentieth. 
Notwithstanding the spread of general incorporation statutes and 
the availability of corporateness to serve purely private interests, the 
partnership form of business remained the standard vehicle of business 
enterprise until well after 1840.76 The partnership form was used in a 
broad array of businesses, whether small merchants and storekeepers 
offering goods and services locally or wealthy merchant bankers engaged 
in more far-flung financial activity. Dramatic improvements in transpor-
tation technology (railroads during the 1840s) and later development of 
communication technology (the telegraph and telephone) permitted the 
dependable inflow of raw materials to, and the outflow of finished goods 
from, U.S. factories on an unprecedented scale.77 Both the production 
and the distribution of goods could technologically take place at much 
higher levels than before. Thus, mass production was combined with 
mass distribution within a single business firm with regional and national 
reach. And this was true whether such a firm grew internally or by ac-
quiring or merging with other smaller enterprises. In turn, large amounts 
of committed financial capital were needed, as well as a pre-arranged, 
centralized governance system that placed operational control in skilled 
managers. 
Business historians attribute the epochal rise of the corporation to 
its remarkable capacity to support these macro-business trends.78 But the 
corporate form of doing business has never been—and should not be—
identified as equivalent to the long-existing activity of business itself. 
Rather, the corporate form is a useful arrangement through which busi-
ness is conducted because it facilitates the accumulation of vast (and 
committed) capital due to the divisibility of investor equity into numer-
ous “shares” of corporate stock. Eventually, unlike the case with partner-
ships, legal rights to a significant degree resided with (or at least were 
based on) the “stock” itself, not the “stockholder.”79 Complex manufac-
turing enterprises also required people with specialized technical and 
managerial expertise, persons who very likely did not provide most of 
                                                 
 76. CHANDLER, supra note 3. Today, another noncorporate form of business—the limited 
liability company—has once again surpassed the corporation in popularity for newly formed, closely 
held businesses. See Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 701, 704 
n.12 (2011) (citing studies). 
 77. CHANDLER, supra note 3, at 76–78, 82–86. 
 78. Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organ-
izers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 389–94 (2003). 
 79. For example, within a corporation, voting rights and the right to receive distributions from 
a corporation are rights associated with the shares of stock—which are alienable—whereas within a 
partnership, voting rights are associated with the partner and typically are not alienable. 
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the financial capital. Thus, the provision of capital to the corporation and 
the management of the corporation were distinct functions, which the 
corporate form acknowledged. Limited liability, moreover, which devel-
oped haltingly, even into the early-twentieth century,80 largely immun-
ized passive investors from business liabilities, unlike nineteenth-century 
partnerships,81 thereby inducing their participation in ventures they did 
not and could not manage. Conversely, creditors of investors could not 
directly reach corporate assets, effectively and efficiently partitioning 
such assets for access by business creditors only. 
These distinctive features would make far greater legal and concep-
tual sense—not to mention linguistic simplicity—if a corporation were 
considered a person or entity distinguishable from both its investors and 
managers.82 Nonetheless, before and after the turn of the twentieth centu-
ry, an intense academic debate over corporate personhood ensued, with 
some advocating precisely such an “entity” theory of corporateness in 
which the corporation was viewed as legally distinct from its constitu-
ents. Others, however, urged the “aggregation” theory in which corpora-
tions were simply viewed as mere aggregations of individuals.83 
A. The Rise of the Entity Theory 
Eventually, proponents of the entity theory prevailed,84 and corpo-
rations by and large were understood as conceptually and legally distinct 
from investors, managers, and other participants. Thought to be central to 
halting the decades-long wrangling over the nature of corporateness was 
a 1926 essay by philosopher John Dewey, who argued that the competing 
theories were infinitely malleable, with each capable of limiting as well 
as enhancing corporate power85—a position Morton Horwitz famously 
set out to refute.86 The late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century debate 
                                                 
 80. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 16, at 291 n.165 (“[I]n most jurisdictions 
throughout the nineteenth century, the usual statutory provision made the shareholder liable for 
much more than—usually twice—the value of his shares.”). 
 81. Today, partnerships also may elect to provide general partners with limited liability, mean-
ing they are not personally liable solely by reason of their partner status for partnership debts or 
obligations. See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 306 (1996). 
 82. Blair, supra note 78. 
 83. Millon, supra note 36. 
 84. Id. at 214; see also Ripkin, supra note 2, at 112–18 (describing natural entity theory but 
asserting courts have used multiple theories). 
 85. John Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 
(1926). As of 1991, this article was described by one commentator as the most influential paper ever 
published by the Yale Law Journal. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Articles from the Yale Law 
Journal, 100 YALE L.J. 1449 (1991). 
 86. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 16, at 68. For a nuanced and extensive response 
to Horwitz’s “refutation,” see Millon, supra note 36. 
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over the nature of corporateness had taken on such urgency in the first 
place only because of what Horwitz described as the “crisis of legitimacy 
in liberal individualism arising from the recent emergence of powerful 
collective institutions.”87 It was widely noted that much of our nation’s 
economic activity was conducted by large corporations and that those 
who controlled the governance of these mammoth organizations wielded 
vast and unprecedented social and economic power.88 Under corporate 
rules as they ultimately developed, these control persons were not the 
stockholders, however, but a small handful of directors and managers.89 
Here, and in other ways too, the legal rules governing the corporate form 
of business differed from those in the partnership form, where the gen-
eral partners at that time typically combined the capital-providing and 
management functions.90 
Thus, those large numbers of investors who provided financial capi-
tal to corporate enterprises did not and could not, at least in public corpo-
rations with dispersed investors, directly control or manage corporate 
affairs. As corporations grew in socioeconomic significance, those who 
managed them grew correspondingly in power, both in relation to inves-
tors and other groups within the enterprise itself and in external relation 
to society at large.91 Moreover, the corporation ushered in a new era of 
big businesses, businesses on a scale never seen before precisely because 
of the unusual corporate features noted above. As observed by Alfred 
Chandler, inevitably this meant that the “regulation of business became 
the paramount domestic issue in American politics in the early twentieth 
century.”92 Contending with the phenomenon of big business meant, nec-
essarily, contending with the phenomenon of its handmaiden, the corpo-
ration. 
The apparent triumph of an entity theory of corporateness—a tri-
umph that took many years after the 1886 Santa Clara decision, which 
formally declared corporations legal persons93—corresponded with an 
extensive endowing of corporations with various legal powers and rights, 
as partially chronicled in the several Citizens United opinions.94 Im-
portantly, however, for corporate theory, although corporations today 
                                                 
 87. Id. at 72. 
 88. The seminal description is found in BERLE & MEANS, supra note 5. 
 89. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (2008) (stating that the business and affairs of a 
corporation are to be managed by or under the direction of its board of directors). 
 90. See Blair, supra note 78. 
 91. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 5. 
 92. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Government Versus Business: An American Phenomenon, in THE 
ESSENTIAL ALFRED CHANDLER: ESSAYS TOWARD A HISTORICAL THEORY OF BIG BUSINESS 425 
(Thomas K. McGraw ed., 1988). 
 93. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 16. 
 94. See supra notes 18–26 and accompanying text. 
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clearly are persons, they still do not have all the constitutional powers 
accorded individuals; for example, they lack the Fifth Amendment pro-
tection against self-incrimination.95 Moreover, they cannot vote or be-
come citizens, and under corporate statutes96 cannot serve as directors of 
corporations, unlike individuals. Horwitz’s extended argument on the 
historical emergence of corporate personhood sought to demonstrate that 
an entity theory was far more compatible with the reality of centralized 
power in the corporate institution than the competing aggregation theory, 
and that it better legitimated such power. In this way, Horwitz seeks to 
offer a historical account of the ascendant reality of the corporate 
“group,” not just the individual, as central to the growing organizational 
complexity of American law and society.97 He insists, however, that it 
was not just any entity theory that prevailed but that it was a “natural-
entity” or “real-entity” theory in particular.98 
Under this conception, a corporation is “a real and natural entity 
whose existence is prior to and separate from the state.”99 That position, 
however, is extremely hard to reconcile with the recent artificial-entity 
language of CTS,100 and Horwitz does not convincingly demonstrate how 
the entity theory’s triumph over the aggregation theory necessarily meant 
that the natural-entity conception theory triumphed over the artificial-
entity theory.101 Each entity theory adequately accounts for the historical 
development of corporate personhood to express with singularity the dis-
tinctiveness of a corporation that was, at the same time, an organization-
ally complex group. To be sure, a contention that corporateness was 
somehow as natural as humanity itself served as a basis both for explain-
ing why corporations existed and that they were no more inherently in 
need of legal regulation than were individuals. But the emergence of cor-
porate legal personhood—whatever the corporation philosophically real-
ly “was”—coupled with the vast scale on which it permitted business to 
be conducted, provided a sufficient conceptual and linguistic foothold to 
argue that these powerful institutions could and should be regulated 
simply because they raised concerns quite different than those raised by 
                                                 
 95. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944). 
Moreover, the Hale opinion itself, being decided in the midst of the heated debate about the nature 
of corporateness, includes elements of both entity and aggregation theories. See supra notes 23, 57. 
 96. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.02 (2008) (Directors must be individual natural 
persons.); see also supra note 22 (Corporations have no “personal privacy” exemption under Free-
dom of Information Act.). 
 97. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 98. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 16. 
 99. Id. at 101. 
 100. See supra note 51. Professor Horwitz’s work, supra note 16, addresses legal develop-
ments only up until the year 1960. CTS was decided in 1987. 
 101. See supra notes 51–57 and accompanying text. 
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individual humans.102 Corporations as varied as Ford Motor Company,103 
ExxonMobil,104 Penn State University,105 the Chicago Cubs,106 and nu-
merous others are influential institutions touching interests far broader 
than those of a single internal constituency and raising external legal-
social issues far different than those of small-scale businesses operating 
in a simpler pre-corporate era. And late-nineteenth and early- to mid-
twentieth-century history reveals a corresponding upsurge of concern 
about the unprecedented business power made possible by corporateness 
and a resultant call for heightened legal regulation.107 
Perhaps what Professor Horwitz means to say is that nineteenth 
century and early-twentieth century American society was gradually 
making an uneasy peace with corporations and accepting them “as if” 
they were natural. After all, they were rapidly becoming a pervasive fea-
ture of the social landscape. Recognizing the need to somehow account 
for the undoubted socioeconomic power and make-up of the emergent 
corporate institution is one thing. But it is quite another to argue that so-
ciety essentially abandoned one traditional approach to exercising social 
control over the inner make-up of that institution—the artificial-entity 
conception—in favor of accepting that corporate attributes at any speci-
fied time and place somehow are preexistent and natural. In both the ear-
ly-nineteenth century Dartmouth College case and the late-twentieth cen-
tury CTS case,108 corporate attributes clearly were regarded as artificial 
or social in character, not natural, and therefore, they remained wholly 
amenable to state modification thought necessary to advance public well-
being.109 
Of course, even natural business entities can be subjected to exten-
sive external regulation—as happened throughout the late-nineteenth and 
                                                 
 102. See William J. Novak, Law and the Social Control of American Capitalism, 60 EMORY 
L.J. 377, 392 (2010) (describing the growing concern from 1872 on with the “social control of busi-
ness”). 
 103. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) (asserting without authority 
that corporations must be carried on primarily for stockholder profit). 
 104. ExxonMobil received more stockholder proposals for consideration at its annual meetings 
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tally disastrous oil spill involving the Exxon Valdez. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 
(2008). In Exxon, while the Court reduced the punitive damages award to a single-digit ratio, it held 
that a corporation should be liable in punitive damages for the acts of its managerial employees that 
recklessly caused environmental harm. 
 105. Penn State is caught up in a far-reaching scandal involving allegations of child abuse by a 
former football coach and inaction by others. 
 106. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (noting how a major league 
baseball team affected the surrounding neighborhood). 
 107. See supra notes 92, 102. 
 108. See supra notes 41, 51. 
 109. See supra note 51. 
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twentieth centuries110—even if states suspended their use of corporate 
law itself as a regulatory tool. Certainly, a natural-entity theory fully 
comports with expectations of responsible corporate behavior—just as 
society in various ways expects such behavior from all human citizens. 
But critically, this expectation is given legal expression through various 
forms of regulation of already-existent corporations—i.e., their behav-
ior—whereas an artificial-entity theory emphasizes the antecedent power 
of the state to add features to, or remove features from, the very legal 
make-up of corporate personhood. The latter insists on continuing, even 
if only occasionally exercised, social control over the legal DNA of the 
corporation, not simply its subsequent conduct. Thus, both theories can 
be conducive to reviving a more public-serving conception of responsi-
ble corporate behavior even though they do so in very different ways. 
The key point with respect to corporate personhood and corporate 
theory’s relationship with the history of corporate responsibility is that 
all of these corporation-centered technological, legal, and intellectual 
currents flowing into the twentieth century set the stage for ensuing cor-
porate responsibility discussions. At the heart of these discussions was a 
return to the issue of whether, to some degree, corporations should once 
again be regarded as public-serving or in modern parlance “socially re-
sponsible.”111 These discussions, building on a strong conception of the 
corporation as a distinct social-legal actor, eventually focused on the 
fundamental questions of corporate purpose and the appropriate role of 
government regulation in controlling corporate conduct.112 These dec-
ades-long debates, which continue today, necessarily drew on, pre-
supposed, and significantly benefited from the clear emergence of a dis-
tinct corporate person prominently featuring centralized control as a crit-
ical element of corporate governance. After all, it is corporate responsi-
bility that emerged in the twentieth century as a topic of ongoing social 
concern and scholarly study.113 This required that the corporation be rec-
ognized as a meaningful social and legal actor in its own right, distin-
guishable from its diverse constituents. 
B. The Reemergence of the Nexus-of-Contracts Theory 
Theoretical acceptance of a strong entity conception of the corpora-
tion did not endure throughout the twentieth century, however, and the 
stunning reemergence of an aggregation-like theory of corporations in 
                                                 
 110. See Novak, supra note 102, at 388, 398 (describing the broad range of business regulation 
arising over the period from 1872 to 1932); see also supra note 30. 
 111. See supra notes 25, 31; Millon, supra note 36. 
 112. See supra notes 28, 30. 
 113. See supra notes 1, 2. 
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the 1980s carries continuing implications for corporate responsibility in 
the twenty-first century. This was a development that Professor Horwitz, 
writing in the early 1990s and ending his history of corporate theory at 
1960, did not address. Influenced by financial economics work in the 
1970s,114 many corporate law theorists in the 1980s conceived the corpo-
ration in decidedly contractarian terms.115 The corporation, in this view 
and much like its nineteenth-century forerunner supposedly vanquished 
by an entity conception, essentially is a nexus of contracts among various 
private constituents.116 Much like the natural-entity theory, moreover, 
this conception had a strong deregulatory and market-oriented thrust, but 
unlike that theory, it also served to boldly reassert, both descriptively and 
prescriptively, the primacy of the individual over the group as the key 
analytical focus in corporate theory and activity.117 Ironically, at a time 
when individuals seem increasingly dwarfed by bureaucratic govern-
ments and other large organizations, this promised to restore the signifi-
cance of the individual to the hierarchical corporation itself. Moreover, 
the recent resurrection of this contractarian theory suggests that although 
distinctive corporate legal personhood clearly had emerged in the early-
twentieth century, as Horwitz argued, theoretical accounts of the corpo-
                                                 
 114. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Other early work in 
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and Some Proposals, (2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1874 
264 and the non-law scholarly works cited in supra note 2; see also Brian M. McCall, The Corpora-
tion As Imperfect Society, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 509 (2011). 
 116. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 115, at 14, 15, 166. 
 117. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 2219–26. 
1160 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 35:1135 
ration are not any more enduring or solidly established today than they 
were one hundred years ago.118 
Yet, the reemergence of the nexus-of-contracts theory in the last 
quarter of the twentieth century had decided counter-ramifications for 
corporate responsibility in ways that are still unfolding. The theory does 
not—it cannot—deny the established doctrine that the corporation is a 
legal person distinct from its various constituencies.119 Thus, the theory 
fully accepts that the corporation has many (though not all) human-like 
features, including certain legal rights and specified responsibilities, in 
its own capacity and separate from those of its various constituencies. 
But at the same time, for a host of reasons, this undoubted legal person is 
considered to be merely a web or network of contractual relationships 
between and among various individuals, such as investors, managers, 
employees, customers, creditors, suppliers, and so on.120 Significantly, 
only the interactions among investors and managers—or more accurately 
investors, directors, and officers—are regarded as comprising the field of 
corporate governance law.121 Other parties, however important their con-
tributions to the flourishing of dynamic enterprise, are regarded as sec-
ondary, instrumental participants, and are remitted to contract law or oth-
er legal regimes dealing with creditors’ rights, employees’ rights, con-
sumer protection, or environmental concerns, and so on.122 Thus, the cor-
poration itself is a dense network of relationships between and among 
various groups, but corporate law concerns itself with only one particular 
strand of this rich matrix. 
Several important consequences result from this recent theoretical 
development. First, the corporation is acknowledged but quickly recedes 
in importance as attention is turned to three groups within the corpora-
tion123—shareholders, directors, and officers.124 This anti-institutionalism 
is clearly seen in agency theory’s focus on the investor-manager relation-
                                                 
 118. It is for this reason, and others, that Professor Ripken advocates a “multi-dimensional” 
approach to corporate personhood. Ripken, supra note 2. 
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ship,125 a focus that essentially ignores the corporation itself as a mean-
ingful concept or person.126 This means as well that an emphasis on the 
interests of the “corporation” as an enterprise, or as a legal-social institu-
tion embodying the common good of numerous constituencies,127 is not 
attended to in corporate law,128 except as a cipher or semantic stand-in 
for the collective shareholders’ interests. 
Nor does contractarian orthodoxy come to grips with the state’s 
continuing (if slumbering) power to “construct” corporate personhood by 
adding or withdrawing such attributes of corporateness as it wishes, 
without regard to shareholder or manager understandings, preferences, or 
expectations.129 In essence, the model seeks to “privatize” an institution 
that, in part, is “publicly” constituted, wrongly concluding that because 
historically states for a long time have not taken an overtly regulatory 
stance through their corporate statutes, corporations therefore must be 
privately ordered. Ongoing strong, and potentially even stronger, public 
influence over the corporation, however, would seem to stretch rather far 
any notion of corporate relations being fully a matter of private ordering 
and being entirely contractual in nature.130 Moreover, to neglect the cor-
poration as a whole is to lose sight of why, from the eighteenth century 
                                                 
 125. See supra note 114. 
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and on, corporate groupings raised concerns for civic republicanism, i.e., 
that persons within a corporation will, together, more effectively seek to 
advance group interests over the public good than can dispersed individ-
uals acting alone.131 
Second, the disaggregating of the corporate person and institution 
into individuals restores individuals—not the collective, corporate 
group—to a place of primacy in the analysis of social groups. Thus, is-
sues are examined from the internal vantage points of shareholders, di-
rectors, and officers, respectively. The institutional focus is lost because 
the singular disaggregating prism of microeconomics is adopted while 
more communitarian, sociological accounts are ignored.132 Although the 
analysis is far more sophisticated than in pre-corporate days—when neo-
classical economics posited individual market interactions—under a 
contractarian theory, the historic legal rise of the corporate firm still can 
be disregarded in favor of a similar focus on market interactions within, 
as well as outside, the “firm.”133 
Third, as an intellectual field of study, corporate governance and 
corporate law concerns itself only with what are considered the three key 
groups: shareholders, directors, and executive officers. As cogently 
summed up by Professor Mark Roe, “Managers and shareholders get to 
play; no one else does.”134 Thus, contemporary law courses in American 
law schools and contemporary law school casebooks focus almost exclu-
sively on these three groups. Students, who someday will be lawyers 
counseling others, are given little occasion to consider whether the nar-
row ambit of corporate law is or is not congruent with broader social ex-
pectations.135 Concerns about corporate responsibility seem somewhat 
alien and out of place in this closed, three-party paradigm. Similarly, dis-
cussions about corporate purpose can be awkward and stillborn because 
contractarian theory does not regard that as a meaningful concept, apart 
from equating corporate with collective shareholder interests. Under a 
contractarian theory, the corporation is a notion to be quickly dissected in 
study, not understood as meaningful in its own institutional right. This 
truncated understanding of corporations permits the teaching and study 
of corporate law, like the carrying on of much corporate activity itself, to 
have a positive and normative focus centered on shareholder financial 
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well-being,136 not some larger corporate good that encompasses but ex-
tends beyond investor welfare. And in this model the imposition of fidu-
ciary duties on directors and officers usefully aims to subdue the pursuit 
of their own self-interest, but in managing the corporation itself, they are 
charged primarily to advance shareholder financial interests. As a result, 
calls for corporate responsibility necessarily do not occupy a central 
place in today’s world of corporate law teaching and scholarship. Overall 
then, the historical emergence of the corporation as a meaningful legal, 
social, economic person and institution⎯however important to society at 
large⎯ends up being of little consequence to today’s corporate law and 
theory. 
The ironic result is that orthodox corporate theory currently has rel-
atively little to say about the corporation itself and even less to say about 
corporate responsibility. To contractarians, as a theory matter, corporate 
responsibility seems incoherent. Apparently, the subject of corporate re-
sponsibility is thought best-discussed and pursued elsewhere, perhaps in 
business ethics courses and other non-law fields of inquiry,137 or perhaps 
through what Professor Reich-Graefe calls “macro theoretical” models of 
the firm struggling with “whether and to what extent the corporate entity 
as an institution of private property and private-party ordering . . . should 
be subordinated to the legitimate claims of the larger society that inextri-
cably embeds its wealth maximization exercise.”138 Within law itself, the 
quest for more responsible corporate conduct is thought to be best 
achieved through various non-corporate law regulatory regimes.139 This 
explains why, today as throughout most of the twentieth century, con-
cerns about corporate responsibility largely find legal expression in the 
vast “external” regulation of the corporation, not in the deep penetration 
of those concerns into the very heart of corporate law theory and govern-
ance, even though governance failures rather regularly radiate outward 
with devastating consequences on so-called third parties.140 Even here, 
however, with passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act141 and the Dodd-Frank 
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Act,142 partial regulatory inroads into corporate governance itself were 
made. Perhaps this is because the social and financial landscape has 
changed so dramatically from the 1980s, when the contractarian theory 
emerged, while corporate theory has not. Moreover, on the reliably con-
troversial and unremittingly pivotal subject of corporate purpose, the 
normative claims of contractarian theory may be at stark odds with cor-
porate law doctrine.143 
V. CONCLUSION 
The subjects of corporate purpose and corporate regulation are tak-
en up in subsequent parts of this larger project.144 For now, we see that in 
the last quarter of the twentieth century, the fluid understandings of cor-
porate theory have taken yet another turn, as they have throughout mod-
ern history, over how best to understand the nature of corporateness. But 
recognition of the corporation as a distinct legal person was never in 
doubt throughout most of the twentieth century, nor is it in doubt today. 
For many in earlier times, the emergence of separate corporate person-
hood both highlighted and usefully opened up the enduringly important 
topic of corporate responsibility. Modern legal theory, however, takes a 
different approach. By trivializing the corporate institution, it accepts 
legal personhood while making it largely unimportant, and it deflects the 
topic of corporate responsibility away from corporate law and into other 
venues.145 In this way, an important and influential segment of socie-
ty⎯those who teach and study corporate law⎯sidestep full engagement 
with important discussions about rightful societal expectations of corpo-
rate conduct in the twenty-first century.146 
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